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1 case, Mr. Justice Black concluded the
In the Bethlehem Steel Corporation
majority opinion of the Supreme Court with the following remarks:

"The problem of war profits is not new. In this country, every war we have engaged
in has provided opportunities for profiteering and they have been too often scandalously
seized. * * * To meet this recurrent evil, Congress has at times taken various measures.
It has authorized price fixing. It has placed a fixed limit on profits, or has recaptured
high profits through taxation. It has expressly reserved for the Government the right to
cancel contracts after they have been made. Pursuant to Congressional authority, the
Government has requisitioned existing production facilities or itself built and operated
new ones to provide needed war materials. It may be that one or some or all of these
measures should be utilized more comprehensively, or that still other measures must be
devised. But if the Executive is in need of additional laws by which to protect the
nation against war profiteering, the Constitution has given to Congress, not to this Court,
the power to make them."
In general, definitive Governmental steps to effectuate a limitation of munitions
profits have awaited the outbreak of a war No real effort was made in this country to impose systematic restrictions upon the profits of manufacturers of munitions
prior to World War I. Furthermore, with the exception of several statutes limiting
the price to be paid for armor plate, enacted in the Spanish-American War, all
efforts to limit war profits prior to 1917 were initiated by the Executive arm of the
Government. Congress evidenced considerable interest in the prices of war materiel during the previous wars, but in the main its activities were limited to investigation and criticism. In the years between World War I and the present war,
the Congress devoted a great deal of attention to the matter of limiting war profits
and made a number of reports on the previous experience with war profit limitation
attempts which could today be studied with a great deal of profit. Nothing definitive, however, was enacted prior to this war.
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I. OByCTIVS OF WAR PROFITs LIMITATIONS
Before discussing the various attempts to control war profits undertaken by the
Federal Government prior to this war, it is necessary to try to eliminate some of
the confusion necessarily inherent in the objectives of price limitations and the objectives of profit limitations. Price limitations may involve profit limitations
but not necessarily. Price limitations are devoted to an economic problem, i.e.,
keeping war costs at a minimum. Wartime profit limitations on munitions are
directed primarily at a morale problem, i.e., the prevention of a slump in the nation's
morale resulting from knowledge that war producers are enjoying what are generally and publicly recognized as excessive profits. We are all agreed that no one
should become "rich" through a war.
"Morale" is an intangible substance, impossible to define precisely. Morale is
largely a psychological matter. The armed forces and the taxpayers demand a
forthright attempt on the part of the Government to prevent a few of the war
contractors from making the war an unconsciously profitable venture for themselves. The difficulties in translating such desires into practical results lie in the
fact that we are still relying on the profit motive as the main incentive for speedy,
efficient and economical production. In an economy as complex as our national
economy, and so long as the profit system remains the primary incentive to produce in time of war, there can be no absolute equalization of the burdens, or profits,
of war. Our problem is, therefore, to maintain production with profit and morale
without undue profit.
The imposition of price controls is almost always dictated by desires to minimize profits and yet too often fails to give full weight to the necessity of keeping
the costs to the Government of procurement of munitions as low as possible in the
light of all pertinent circumstances. This control of cost to the Government is
logically a vastly more important matter than the limitation of profits to the contractor, yet that is not realized by the general public. Furthermore, price controls,
dealing with all the elements of price, are difficult to establish. The Government
in wartime must attempt in every way possible to encourage increased efficiency
in production and the ensuing reduction in contractors' costs. Prices of munitions
to the Government in wartime must be based, or perhaps, measured, ultimately
upon cost of production. There is no other standard in wartime upon which to
compute such prices. Producers should, of course, receive different rates of profits
based upon the efficiency and skill with which they can reduce their costs of production. War procurement must also take into account many factors which affect
cost-labor supply problems, maintenance of small businessmen, encouragement of
inventions, and the like. Furthermore, the Government must acquire war supplies
and weapons regardless of the cost to it or to the contractor.
The cost-plus form of contract has often been advanced as the only method of
accurately determining the profits to the contractor; yet the cost-plus-a-percentage-
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of-cost contract induces waste and high costs and the cost-plus-a-detemined-dollarfee contract contains no incentives for reduced costs and minimizes the spur of the

profit incentive. Profits should, theoretically, be a reward for performance and
should be judged and compared in terms of relative performance.
In addition, profits are a relatively minor factor in the overall cost to the Government when munitions are being procured on the vast scale required for this
war; a one per cent difference in profits would probably create more millionaires
today than were created in the whole of World War I and have a small effect on
our national economy. Government limitation of ptofits is also a major factor in
minimizing inflation.

We are, indeed, faced with a dilemma and it is in this light that our previous
failures to solve the problem should be judged.
II. ATTEMPTs PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

In the early wars of this nation, contractors sold war materials to the Government at exorbitant prices. There are numerous public references during the Revolution to the excessive profits of suppliers and contractors, particularly in foodstuffs.'
The Continental Congress did evidence considerable interest in the costs of
articles of war. For instance, the Naval Committee in 1775 recommended the
construction of thirteen frigates as the backbone of the new American Navy and

recommended further that the cost of these vessels, with two complete sets of
sails, should not exceed $66,666 on the average. 'On December 13, 1775, the Continental Congress appointed a committee, "with -full powers to carry the above report
into execution," and thus indicated its intent that the vessels authorized should be
acquired within the cost estimated by the Naval Committee As a matter of fact,
the Revolution did summon into activity an immense range of legislative power over
prices and profits. Most of this power was exercised by the states, for the Continental
Congress constituted a government with limited authority over the loosely-knit
federation of states. It was the legislation by the states during the Revolution, however, which laid the broad foundation for the legislative power of the national government in time of war. Thus we find that the Continental Congress on November
22, 1777 recommended to certain of the state legislatures that they appoint "commissioners to regulate and ascertain the price of labour, manufactures, internal
produce" and so forth. A month later the same body recommended "to the respective legislatures of the United States, forthwith to enact laws, appointing suitable
persons to seize and take, for the use of the Continental Army of the said States, all
woolen cloths, blankets, linens, shoes," and so on. In response to these resolutions,
the state legislature did enact many laws fixing prices of labor and commodities,
4
sometimes in the greatest detailV
Typical of the attempts to control prices during
Hearings before the Committee on Military A§airs on H. R. 3 and H. R. 5293, 74 th Cong., ist
Sess. (1935) 590-598.
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the Revolution was the law enacted by the State of New York in 1780 under which
the profits of manufacturers, wages of mechanics and laborers, and prices of a long
list of commodities were fixed at a figure "not to exceed twenty fold of the prices
paid in 1774." The latter date was chosen as reflecting normal conditions, and
the twentyfold as measuring the debasement of the continental currency. This
statute represented an effort to check inflation after it had occurred.5
Both the Army and the Navy were rather restricted by the parsimony of the
Congress in the years between the Revolution and the Civil War. No real attempts
were made to prevent profiteering in war supplies during this period, in part because so few supplies were being purchased.
The Civil War saw a vast increase in the purchases of war mat&iel, with largescale profiteering evident in the procurement of both the Army and the Navy. In
the War Department, Secretary Stanton, after his appointment in 1862, made strenuous efforts to effect an improvement in the methods of Army purchasing. He
established a commission to audit and adjust claims under contracts with the War
Department and this commission in 1862 and thereafter was successful in elim-

inating many excessive and fraudulent claims.0 The most publicized war contracts were those let by General Fremont, Commander of the Western Department,
in the early part of the war.7 The Secretary of War appointed the Holt-Davis

Commission to reconsider all of the contracts let under General Fremont's direction, and this Commission was instrumental in negotiating settlements at reduced
prices with a large number of the contractors.8

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles met with similar difficulties in acquiring
new vessels and supplies for the Navy during the Civil War. After unsatisfactory

experiences with commission agents in the early months of the war, Welles in 1861
appointed his brother-in-law, George D. Morgan, as the agent to make all pur-

chases of vessels for the Navy Morgan did an efficient job of buying vessels at
much lower prices than the Navy had theretofore paid. The Secretary of the Navy
was severely criticized for appointing a relative as the sole agent for the purchase

of vessels, and the House Select Committee on Government Contracts submitted a
resolution calling for the disapprobation by the House of Representatives of the

practice. Even the Congress, however, was forced to admit that substantial savings had been effected by Morgan's purchases.1°
'H. R. REP. No. 8o8, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (1937) 3 (Report of the House Military Affairs Committee on H. R. 6704).
'REP. Sc'Y WAx (1862); Cf. also CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE NVAR YERs (1939),
Vol. 1, 423, 440.
'Frmont's purchases resulted in a number of actions in the courts. Reeside v. United States, 2 Ct.
Cl. 1 (1866), aff'd by a decision of the Supreme Court reported at 7 Ct. Cl. 82 (r868), gives a detailed
picture of how Frimont operated in purchasing Army supplies. See also United States v. Morgan, 554
U. S. 565 (1869); United States v. Burton, 154 U. S. 566 (1869); United States v. Adams, 74 U. S.
463 (1868), reversing 2 Ct. Cl. 70 (1866); United States v. Mowry, 154 U. S.564 (1869), reversing
2 Ct. C1. 68 (x866).

s United States v. Adams, 74 U. S.463 (1868).
'REP. SEC'Y NAVY (1861).
" See discussion on the report of the House Select Committee on Government Contracts, 131 CoNo.
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All of the efforts at limitation of profits on Government contracts during the
Civil War were undertaken by the Executive Departments, with, it is true, considerable prodding by the Congress. Many of the excesses in the prices paid fo
war munitions were the result of outright fraud upon the Government, and bribery
of Government officials was by no means uncommon. Congress did enact various
criminal statutes to prohibit certain of the fraudulent practices in connection with
Government contracts."
While the Civil War gave impetus for a time to large scale productibn of war
munitions, no permanent munitions industry grew up in this nation, because the
Army and Navy ordered almost nothing for some years after the war. It was not
until the Government began to build the new Navy in the early eighties that important contracts for munitions were let to large manufacturers. 2
In the development of plants in this country for the manufacture of heavy armor
for the ships of the fleet, the Navy had paid prices for armor ranging between $574
and $671 per ton. Feeling that such prices were unreasonable, the Congress enacted a statute approved March 3, z897, limiting the average price to be paid by the
Navy for armor to $300 per ton. Several months thereafter another statute was
passed authorizing the Secretary of the Navy, if he could not procure armor at
$30o per ton, to establish a public armor factory and to appoint a naval board to
advise him on the subject. 3 The armament manufacturers refused to manufacture
armor at this price, and with the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898,
Contracts were let on this basis,
Congress increased the authorized price to $400'
but Congress by the Act of March 3, 1899, again limited the price to $3o0 per ton.' 5
Again the manufacturers refused to submit any bids except at prices per ton considerably in excess of this amount." Finally, by the Naval Appropriation Act,
19oi, the Congress authorized the Secretary of the Navy to procure by contract
armor "at a price which in his judgment is reasonable and equitable"; if the Secretary could not make satisfactory contracts for armor, he was authorized to erect
a factory to produce heavy armor, and $4,000,000 was appropriated for the purposeYF
The armor plant was never erected by the Navy.
GLOBE, Vol. 32, Pt. 4, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix, April 28, 1862, 124-130; CARL SANDBURG,
YRARS (1939), Vol. I, 426. For further consideration of both Army and
ABRmtni LINCOLN, ThE WVAR
Navy contracts, cf. the testimony and reports of the Committee on Government Contracts, 3 7 th Cong.
(1862), Vols. I and 2; H. R. ExEc. Doc. No. 65, 3 9th Cong., 2d Sess. (1866-67).
a1Cf. Act of July x6, x862, 12 STAT. 577 (1862), with slight modification now 18 U. S. C. 194o ed.,
§§199, 202; Act of July 17, 1862, 12 STAT. 594, 596 (1862).
1

and MARGARET SPRoUr, Tim RIsE OF AmERCAN NAVAL PoWER (1939) 165 et seq.; ii
Soc. SCIENCES (1934) x28 (article, Munitions Industry).
11 C. 0. PAULLIN, A HALF CENTURY OF NAVAL AD-mINISTRATION IN AMERICA, 1861-I911, 40 UNITED
1059, io6r; Act of March 3, 1897, 29 STAT. 648, 665;
STATES NAVAL INsTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (914)
Act of July 19, 1897, 30 STAT. 105, x23; JOHN D. LONG (Secretary of the Navy, z897-1902), Tim NEW
AMERICAN NAVY (1903), Vol. 1, 46 et seq.
"2 Act of March 3, 1899, 30 STAT. 1015, 1045.
"4 Act of May 4, 1898, 30 STAT. 369, 390.
10 LONG, op. ct., supra note 13 at Vol. 1, page 50.
" Act of June 7, 1900, 31 STAT. 684, 707; H. R. Doc. No. 95, 5 5 th Cong., 2d Sess.; 31 CONO.
REc. 934 (1898), 32 CoNG. RIEC. 2190-2191 (1899); Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance,
attached to RP. SEc'Y NAvY (905), 45-47.
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The first attempt to limit profits by statute had thus threatened to cut off production of armor entirely. Profiteering in munitions and supplies was prevalent
during the Spanish-American War, as in the Civil War.' The effort to restrict
war profits by setting a top price to be paid for munitions had been a complete
failure. Though price-fixing was used to some extent in the first World War, no
attempt was again made to attack the overall problem of war profits by establishing
top prices for munitions.
The Government relied largely on competitive bidding as a means of limiting
profits on all Government contracts prior to World War .18 There have been
recent investigations which indicate that the system of competitive bids did not
perhaps achieve the lowest prices to the Government, 0 but it is difficult to draw
any just comparisons between Government purchases in peacetime and purchases
in wartime. In peacetime there is generally a buyers' market for war materials,
while in wartime the market clearly favors the sellers.
III. WORLD WAR I

PROFIT LIMITATION ATTEMPTS

The outbreak of World War I found the nation, as usual, without any program whatsoever for control of munitions prices or profits. True, the Congress
had in 1916 passed an act imposing a tax of 2Y per cent on the profits of manufacturers of munitions,21 and on March 3, 1917, an act was approved providing
for an excess profits tax of 8 per cent. 2 Neither of these statutes was aimed primarily at limitation of profits on war contracts; the first was largely a reflection
of the spirit of the times in reacting against traffic in munitions, and the second
appears to have been primarily a revenue measure.
There were three primary types of attempted profit limitations during the first
World War: (I) the use of cost-plus contracts, (2) price fixing and control, and
(3) excess-profits taxes. The several Congressional committees which have investigated the matter of war profits in the last war have demonstrated quite conclusively that none of these methods accomplished effective limitation of profits or
prices.
The first months of World War I were marked by the confusion and lack of
planning in the procurement of war materiel. For a time, there was no central
coordinating agency, and there was absolutely no program for mobilization of
industry to produce for war. For a time the Army and Navy tried to continue
their peacetime procurement methods of purchasing from the lowest bidder. In" WVALTER MILLIS, THE MARTIAL SPIRIT, A STUDY OF OUR WAR WITH SPAIN (1931) passim; Hearings before House Committee on Military iffairs on H. R. 3 and 5293, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935)

590-598.
"oThe basic statute was Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes.
" SEN. REP. No. 944, 74 th Cong., ist and 2d Sess. (Nye Committee, 1935-1936); SEN. REP. No.
480, Pt. 5, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Truman Committee, 1942); H. R. REP. No. 576, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(House
Naval Affairs Committee, January 20, 1942).
"12 Act of September 8, 1916, 39 STAT. 756, 780.
" Act of March 3, 1917, 39 STAT. 1000. Excess profits were defined as profits above 8 per cent
of "actual capital" plus $5ooo.
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deed, even after January, 1918, many contracts made by the Army Quartermaster's
Corps were let on this basis 3 The initial stage of war procurement saw purchases being made on the old-fashioned bid basis, with the several Government
agencies actually competing against each other in securing supplies.2 4 Some agencies
therefore obtained excessive quantities of supplies while others did not obtain
sufficient to meet their needs, and the prices of various war supplies were inflated
because of the inflated demands of the several agenciesP 5 The President early
established coordinating agencies to bring some order into Government procurement, starting with the Council of National Defense and ending with the War
Industries Board in July, 197."6
a. Cost-plus Contracts
The competitive bid system, however, could not continue long during wartime.
As prices of raw materials and labor rose rapidly, contractors refused to take fixedprice contracts. Accordingly, the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts were devised and came into increasing use in the early part of the war. Thus, the Secretary
of the Navy noted that shipbuilders refused to submit fixed-price bids for battle
cruisers2 7 The Supreme Court in the Bethlehem Steel Corporation case 2 " approvingly quoted the i99 report of the Chief of the Construction Division, War
Department:
Obviously no sane man would bid on a lump sum contract under such conditions,
unless perchance he should treat the matter as a pure gamble and include an excessive
margin in his proposal for unforeseen contingencies.
Cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts for a time supplanted all other forms of
contracts for the larger purchases of the armed forces and the Emergency Fleet
Corporation. Of more than $i,75o,ooooo in contracts executed by the Army Ordnance Department up to the end of 1917, the Chief of Ordnance testified that the
great majority of these contracts were let on the cost-plus basis 9 As the cost-plusa-percentage-of-cost form of contract lent itself readily to abuse, the cost-plus-a-fixedfee contract was introduced and to some extent supplanted the other type of
"' J.

F. CROWELL, GOVERNMENT WAR CONTRACTS

(I920)

21

(Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, No. 25).

ECONOafC COA.MxNsrARY, T RmPORARY NATiONAL ECONOMIC COMtNo. i9 (76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1940), 43 et seq.; GRASIE, THE LAw op GoVmzENT DEFENSE CONTRAcTs (1941) 6-8.
s James R. Withrow, The Control of War Profits in the United States and Canada (942) 93 U.
op PA. L. REv. 194, 199.
"8 For the chronological sequence of unifying agencies, see TNEC MONOGRAPH No. xg, supra note
24, at 45 etseq.; GRAsKE, op. cit., supra note 24, at 8, 9, and BAEucH, AaimmcIAx IwNusRY iN THE WAR,
REPORT OF THE WAx INnusTmRs
BOARD To rim PREsmNT (1921), passim.
"1 REP. SEc'y NAvY (1917) 30. The Naval Appropration Act of 1916 (August 29, 1916, 39 STAT.
556) had provided that the Secretary might contract for such ships "on the basis of the actual cost
plus a reasonable profit to be determined by him," and the major shipbuilders all submitted bids on a
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis.
-sSee United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289, 302 (1942).
" GOVERMENT PURCHASING-AN

nTrrEE

MONOURAP

"Hearings before the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, Series I, Pt. 5,

66th Cong., ist Sess. (1919) 488.
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contract. 0 The difficulties of determining the "actual cost" under a cost-plus contract were just as great in 1917 as they are today; in addition, there was the problem
that under cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts, the contractors were tempted to
increase their profits by increasing the cost. Apparently the Navy Department
adopted as a basis for the determination of cost the principles set forth in the x916
munitions profits tax act,81 but these principles were so general in terms as to
furnish no guide at all.8 The interdepartmental conference of July, x917 on uniformity of contracts and cost accounting condemned the percentage-of-cost system
and recommended instead the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract3
The cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract was by no means the answer to all of the
problems inherent in procuring war supplies at reasonable cost, with reasonable
profits to the contractor. In World War I, as in the present war, the cost-plus-afixed-fee type of contract gave rise to many difficult administrative and accounting
problems; in particular, the accurate determination of costs required a very large
force of skilled auditors and accountants 4 Similarly, a desire to provide an incentive to reduce costs led to a modification of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract in
the form of a bonus added to the fixed fee for savings in actual cost as compared
with estimated cost. It was in fact this type of contract which was before the
Supreme Court in the Bethlehem Steel Corporation case and illustrated the tendencies such contracts have to encourage somewhat exaggerated estimates of cost.
The Army and the Navy made ostensible efforts to limit profits on the cost-plus
contracts; both the War and Navy Departments included in a number of their
contracts provisions specifying that profits thereon should be limited to io per cent
of the actual cost? 5 These limitations imposed in the contracts were not effective;
and apparently no effort was made to recapture profits in excess of the specified
percentages. Mr. Justice Black pointed out in his Bethlehem Steel Corporation
opinion that any citation of the io per cent figure as indicating average profits on
cost-plus contracts during the first World War was "illusory" and "without basis
in the realties of business experience."8 6 A report of the Federal Trade Commis"CH-*LFs

E. HuoHEs, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY GENERAL ON TiE AIRCRAF'T INDUSTY

(1918)

reprinted as Appendix A, 57 CONG. REc. 883, 9o6 (i9i8); H. R. REP. No. 8r6, 66th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1918) 49-53 (Expenditures in the War Department-Camps).
"Act of September 8, xz96, 39 STAT. 756, §302.
134,

"The Secretary of the Navy remarked that as "regards the determination of the actual cost, hardly
any two accountants would agree exactly, this being a highly technical question involving a large number of factors." REP. SEc'Y NAVY (1917) 3r. He further stated that the 1916 munitions tax act had
been "found satisfactory in general" as a basis for cost determination, "although detail difficulties have
naturally arisen."
3

TNEC MoNoGRAPH No. i9, supra note 24, at 50.

"' Cf. HuGHms, supra note 30, wherein he stated that "contracts of this sort lead to waste, foster
abuses, and impose an almost intolerable burden of cost accounting, in itself a hindrance to rapid
production," noted by Mr. Justice Black in the Bethlehem Steel Corp. opinion, 315 U. S. 289, 306.
5
" REp. SEc'Y WAR (1917) Vol. I, 28; id. (1918) Vol. 1, z19; id. (1919) 4138-42; REP. SEC'Y
NAVY (1917) 33; id. (i918) 685; id. (i920) 147-8.
8
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289, 3o6-8 (1942).
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sion, made in 1918 pursuant to Senate resolution, also makes it clear that profits
on war contracts ran much above io pef cent in several of the major industries 7
Mention should perhaps be made of the wide use of compulsory orders during World War I. Authority under the compulsory order statutes 38 was often
invoked to bring about purchases at reasonable prices when the prices quoted
appeared too high. No stigma was attached to the issuance of a compulsory order
in World War I; in contrast, compulsory orders are rarely employed in the present
war9 In fact, the reduction of stipulated contract prices by means of the compulsory order might be termed a primitive method of renegotiation, although the
analogy is not very apt. Nevertheless, the compulsory orders in World War I
were employed to a limited extent in the light of total volume of procurement,
and they were utilized in place of a contract, not to change prices under already
executed contracts.
b. Price-fixing
At the same time that the Government agencies were attempting to maintain
some form of control over profits under the several forms of cost-plus contracts,
the General Munitions Board, and later the War Industries Board, approached the
problem from the angle of fixing prices on certain commodities. Strangely enough,
no statute authorizing over-all fixing of prices was enacted during the war. The
War Industries Board derived such power to fix prices as it exercised from the
40
power granted to the President to place compulsory orders with any manufacturer,
and its derivative power to allocate priorities. 1 The food and fuel control act of
19174 gave the President very broad powers of control over prices of food and fuel
products and through those powers the Food and Fuel Administration was able to
exercise some authority over prices with statutory backing.
The War Industries Board established a Price Fixing Committee to fix prices
for products other than foods and fuels; this Committee dealt almost exclusively
with raw materials4 The Committee was hampered in that it did not administer
the prices it set, leaving this function to the commodity sections of the War Industries Board. Its general policy was to fix prices at fairly high levels, with the result
that the low-cost producers in an industry made large profits. The Board justified
"Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 3 and 5293, 74th Cong., ist Sess.
(1935) 604 et seq. The report of the Federal Trade Commission (TAX, NTHE PROFITS OUT oF WAR)
is one of the exhibits, pages 604 et seq.
" National Defense Act of 19x6 (June 3, 1916), 39 STAT. 213, 50 U. S. C. 194o ed. §8o; Act of

March 4, 1917, 39 STAT. 213, 50 U. S. C. 1940 ed. §309; Act of June 15, 1917, 40 STAT. 182. Cf.
RP. SFc'Y NAvy (1917) 33.
" Present authority is Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 885,
892, as amended, 50 U. S. C. 1940 ed. §309 (Appendix).

"5 Supra note 38.
"t0 Abels, Price Control in War and Emergency (1942) 90 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 675, 682 et seq.
" Act of August io, 1917, 40 STAT. 276.

"'TNEC

MONoGRAPH No. i9, supra note 24, at 51, 52. The armed services were represented
on the Price Fixing Committee, which was evidently very careful in performing its functions not to

interfere with their procurement.

Cf. REP'. Sac'Y NAvY (i918) 98.
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this policy by the proposition that it was concerned first of all with stimulating
production, and was forced to look after the less efficient producers in order to
keep the full capacity of the industry in operation. It relied on the tax laws to
recover much of the excessive profits.
Ostensibly, the Price Fixing Committee set prices by agreement with the industry concerned. Thus, Mr. Baruch, in his report to the President in 1921, remarked
that the "bases in law for different regulations were varied, and in some cases
doubtful," and emphasized the processes of negotiation by which the Government
and industry arrived at prices. 44 In point of fact, there was little about the agreements which was voluntary-they were entered into under thinly-veiled compulsion, the threat of commandeering. Mr. Baruch himself bluntly recognized this
fact in later years, when he admitted that universal compliance with the price
regulations was obtainable only with the aid of potential compulsion, and that
"price-fixing by agreement" was as much of a euphemism as calling conscription
"selective service" and referring to registrants for the draft as "mass volunteers."40
The attempts of the War Industries Board to fix prices (limited, as heretofore
noted, largely to raw materials) did not achieve very much in the way of limitation
of profits.04 The Government in World War I ultimately relied almost entirely
upon the excess-profits tax to eliminate excessive profits. It took the nation some
little time, however, to come to this conclusion and to work out adequate tax laws.
c. Excess-profits Taxes
Mention has heretofore been made of the excess-profits tax imposed in March,
I917Y' This statute was soon superseded by the War Revenue Act of I917,41
which was retroactive for the period the March law was in effect, and applied to

all business, whether carried on by individuals, partnerships, or corporations. The
tax was computed on the net income in excess of a specifically defined normal
return (the average rate of return of the business in the years 1911-1913), not to
exceed io per cent or be less than 7 per cent upon invested capital plus a specific
credit. The rates of tax (varying from 2o per cent to 6o per cent) were graduated
according to the amount by which the net income in excess of the designated
normal return (rate) on invested capital exceeded specified percentages of the tax-

payer's invested capital. The rate of tax on an individual or occupation "employing" no invested capital or not more than a nominal capital was a flat 8 per cent
of the net income in excess of $6ooo.
These taxes did not adequately get at the large scale profits enjoyed by the larger
Government contractors. President Wilson in a message to Congress on May 27,
"BA~ucu, supra note

26, at 72 et seq.
"H. R. Doc. No. 163, 72d Cong., lst Sess. (1931) 817 (Hearings Before War Policies Commission). The legal section of the War Industries Board on June 18, 1918, concluded that a threat to
commandeer expressed in the form of a contract to induce the fixing of the price did not constitute
duress. Abels, supra note 4r, at 684.
"GROSVENOR
B. CLAxxoN, INnUsnTAL AMERICA IN THE VoRLD AVR (1923) 322; FTC report,
supra note 37, pas.-m.
7 Supra note 22.
"Act of October 3, 1917, 40 STAr. 300.
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1918, indicated the need for a new tax bill to curb the profiteering which he noted
was indisputable.4 9 Shortly thereafter, the Senate passed a resolution requiring
the Secretary of the Treasury to submit information on war profits, specifically, to
report all corporations which had earned over 15 per cent on their capital stock in
1917, and the 1916 profits of such corporations3 ° On June io, 1918 , another resolution was passed (both resolutions having been submitted by Senator Borah),
directing the Federal Trade Commission to report on profiteering.51 The Commission's report was specific in indicating that profiteering existed in many lines.52
Pursuant to the earlier resolution, the Treasury Department's report was submitted
on July 5, 1918; it showed high profit percentages and large salaries.53
After obtaining these factual studies, Congress finally enacted a tax law which
in effect carried out President Wilson's program 5 4
The 1918 law changed the coverage of the tax to include only corporationsY5
The 1918 law set up a new standard of normal income and added a war-profits
tax to be paid to the extent that it exceeded the excess-profits tax. The war-profits
tax was 8o per cent of the excess of the net income of the taxpayer over the warprofits credit, which consisted, roughly speaking, of an average of the income for
the three pre-war years (1911-1913) plus $3ooo, with the further provision that the
minimum war-profits credit should be io per cent of the invested capital. The
result of the application of this rather complicated formula, as was pointed out by
the Nye Committee,5 5 was that corporations with meager pre-war incomes were
assured of at least a io per cent return, free from the war-profits tax, but if they
were fortunate enough to have a high rate of earnings before the war they were
enabled to get an additional exemption. The 8o per cent rate of the war-profits
tax was thus not imposed upon the entire profits of the corporation, but only upon
the excess over the average pre-war income.
The 1918 tax act retained the excess-profits tax as an alternative, to be paid if it
was higher than the war-profits tax. The maximum excess-profits tax rate was 65
per cent, and the excess-profits credit was fixed at 8 per cent of the invested capital
for the taxable year plus $3ooo.
The excess-profits tax was retained after the war with reduced rates. The 8o
per cent rate and the war-profits credit w'ere abandoned, and the maximum excessprofits rate was dropped to 4o per cent for 1919 and 192o. While the rates were
,056 CONG. RFc. 7115 (1918).
"OSen. Res. No. 253, 56 CONG. REc. 7231 (x918)

(65th Cong., 2d Sess.); id. at 7419 (1918).

F7 Sen. Res. No. 255, 56 CoNG. REc. 7558 (1918) (65th Cong., zd Sess.).
" Sen. Doe. No. 248, 56 CoNG. Rae. 8458-62 (z918), also printed in Hearings before House Cominitee on Military Affairs on H. R. 3 and H. R. 5293, 74th Cong., xst Sess. (1935) 604 et seq. Later
the Commission made reports on profits in several industries, e.g. Cost REP.ORTS OF TmE FEDERAL TADE
CoMMIssioN-COPPER, June 30, 1919.
"aSen. Doc. No. 259, 56 CoNG. REc. 867Y (i918).
" Revenue Act of 1918, 40 STAT. 1057 (approved February 24, 1919).

The House Ways and Means Committee recommended this action because of the administrative
difficulties in administering the excess profits tax as to individuals and because of the feeling that the
heavy income surtaxes would render substantial justice between individual and corporate taxpayers.
' SEN. REP. No. 577 ON H. R. 5529, 74 th Cong., ist Sess. (1935).
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thus reduced for the years after 1918, the Revenue Acts did contain a provision
designed to continue the application of the 1918 war-profits tax rates to profits on
war contracts entered into during the period April 6, 1917, to November II, 1918.
Under the 1918 act the net income remaining after the deduction of the war-profits
and excess-profits taxes was subjected to a normal corporation tax of 12 per cent
for 1918 and io per cent for igi9 and i92o. The excess-profits tax expired in 1921.
The pivotal figure in the computation of the excess-profits tax was, of course,
the computation of invested capital. Invested capital was made up on an historical
or cost basis-it included cash paid in for shares, paid in or earned surplus and
undivided profits (not including surplus and undivided profits earned during the
year) but excluded borrowed capital and any assets (such as corporate shares)
the income from which was not included in computing taxable profit. Assets
were valued at original cost, revised by the depreciation or depletion allowed. If
not acquired by purchase, they were taken at their actual cash value at the time of
acquisition, but rigid limitations were imposed upon the value of good will and
other intangible assets paid in for stock or shares. Any writing up of assets through
revaluation, reorganization after March 3, 1917, or otherwise was in general forbidden, and corporations which had written up their assets or reorganized before
this date secured an enormous advantage thereby. It was extremely difficult to
work out invested capital in a large number of cases, and there was a great deal
of litigation on this issue.5"
Mr. Baruch told the War Policies Commission that the World War excessprofits taxes could not capture profits due to price rises and, indeed, increased
inflation because they took less than ioo per cent of profits in excess of the normal
return.58
As a revenue measure, the excess-profits tax appears to have been successful in
World War I. Its yield became the largest source of revenue apart from borrowings; the average yield of the tax during the three-year period 1917 to I99 was
almost $2,ooooooooo, or more than one-fourth of the entire ordinary receipts of
the Government. Apparently it was paid during the war without too much complaint or hardship, in part because of the enormous profits being made by Government contractors, and in part because of the relief provisions of the law and
administrative regulations. The World War excess-profits tax was administered
as a tax measure to bring needed funds into the Treasury. The Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury estimated that taxes during the war absorbed about 70 per cent of
" The Nye Committee points to the history of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company's controversy with the Government on this subject. It took until 1931-14 years-to settle the
company's 1917 taxes because of the difficulties of determining invested capital, and then settlement was
made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue only because it finally gave up and decided that it could not
determine the company's invested capital but would make a special assessment. Under the assessment,
the exemption was the same percentage of the company's net income as the average exemption of
representative concerns in the same or similar business was of the average net income of such concerns.
StN. REP. No. 944, Pt. 2, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 21.
- H. R. Doc. No. 163, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (931) 798 (Hearings before War Policies Commission).
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the increase of the average profits of the war years over the average profits for the
years immediately before the war.59 The Nye Committee challenged these figures
and calculated that only 44 per cent of the increase of war-years profits over pre-war
profits was taken in taxes.06 Whichever percentage is taken, it is evident that
there was a very wide margin for substantially increased profits arising out of the
war. The controversies as to the taxes appeared to arise largely in the post-war
years when the taxpayer might be confronted with additional claims for taxes, not
contemplated during the war when he paid taxes, however patriotically, on the
basis of his own returns.
After 1919, as profits declined, the law was subjected to considerable attack and
many taxpayers collected large refunds. In 1920, Secretary of the Treasury Houston
described the complexities of the income and profits taxes as "clogging the administrative machinery and threatening, indeed, its possible breakdown." Tax evasion
and tax avoidance became far more prevalent after the war.6 '
The excessive administrative burden of the World War I excess-profits tax, the
difficulties with invested capital determinations, the rigidity of the application of
the tax, and its failure to reach a large segment of war profits, all indicate that the
excess-profits tax, on the basis of such World War experience, is not alone sufficient to cope with the problem of war profits.
IV. CoNswERATIoN OF WAR PROFIT LIM ITATIONS BETWEEN THE Two WARS

Following the first World War the Government returned to competitive bidding
as the method for keeping profits down on Government contracts. This was the
major safeguard until 194o, although with the passage of the Vinson-Trammel Act
in 1934, Congress applied the percentage of cost limitation of profits formula to a
substantial dollar volume of Government contracts. In 1940, Congress turned again
to the excess-profits tax as a means of attacking the limitation of profits on a general
basis. The excess-profits tax, plus certain statutes limiting profits on cost-plus-afixed-fee contracts to specified percentages, constituted the main instrment of profit
limitation up to the passage of the renegotiation statute on April 28, 1942.2
During the 23-year period between the armistice ending World War I and the
outbreak of the present war, Congress considered approximately 2oo bills and resolutions dealing, in one way or another, with the limitation of war profits. Of this
number, less than one-fourth received serious consideration. No bill dealing with
the entire problem of war profits became law. Certain statutes were enacted limiting profits to fixed percentages of price or cost of some munitions, but these
statutes were peacetime measures, not designed to deal with war profits. The
Second Revenue Act of 1940, imposing an excess-profits tax, may be described as
ro H. R. Doc. No. 163, 72d Cong., ist Sess. ('931) 689, 69o (Statement of Arthur Ballantine to
the War Policies Commission).
"oSEN. REP'. No. 944, Pt. 2, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 13-15.
'ld. at 44 et seq.

as 56 STAT. 245, 41 U. S. C. A., note prec. §i (Supp. 1942).

LAW ANDo CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

an effort to limit profits on war contracts. Reliance was placed on the excess-profits
tax in the period between October 8, 1940 (date of approval of the Revenue Act)
and the enactment of the renegotiation statute (April 28, 1942).
a. r919-I 934
The investigations conducted during this period between the two wars indicated much criticism of and dissatisfaction with the attempts at profit limitation
during World War I. It was not until 1924 that Congress began to study certain
bills designed to limit war profits. Meanwhile, some effort had been made to set
up a planning agency to program more efficiently the mobilization of industry in
the event of war. Because of the shockingly poor record of the Government in
World War I in getting munitions to the actual theaters of combat,6 3 the immediate consideration for the armed services was the establishment of some overall
program for the rapid transformation of industry to wartime production.
The National Defense Act of I92O4 was the first result of this pressure to
increase the efficiency of wartime procurement and it directed the Assistant Secretary
of War to make "adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs." The War Department expended
considerable effort in drawing up a program of industrial mobilization for war.6 *
While elements of the program were utilized as the nation prepared for the present
war, it was never put into operation. By joint order of the Secretaries of War and
the Navy, the Army-Navy Munitions Board was established in 1922 to coordinate
procurement by the two services.66 All of these efforts were directed primarily at
a more efficient and speedy method of wartime procurement; the planning did
touch upon the prevention of war profits, but this essentially more difficult (though
less important) problem was not emphasized.
The American Legion was instrumental in x922 in having introduced in Congress the Capper-Johnson bill to deal with limitation of war profits.6 7 This bill
was sweeping in its terms, and while efforts were made to secure favorable action
upon it, the Congress did not consider it.6 s At the same time, Representative John
J. McSwain of South Carolina introduced a joint resolution to create a special Federal Commission to investigate the whole subject of war profits and to recommend
63 TNEC MONOGiaPH No. I9, supra note 24, at 53.
e4 4 STAr. 759, 764, 765 (X920).
esRFP. SEc'T WAR (937)

27.

" The joint Board (established by a joint order of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, dated
July z7, 19o3) established the Army-Navy Munitions Board by letter of June 27, 1922, approved by the
Secretaries of War and of the Navy on June 29, 1922. By Executive Order 9024 of January x6, 1942,

the Army-Navy Munitions Board was directed to report to the President through the Chairman of the
War Production Board. By organization order of February 21, 1942, the Under Secretaries of W'ar and
of the Navy established the membership of the Board as the Under Secretaries and a civilian chairman
appointed by them.
"'H. R. 13201, 67th Cong., 4 th Sess., introduced December 6, 1922. The American Legion looms
rather large in actively sponsoring or supporting many of the efforts to control war profits; it was instrumental in having a number of bills introduced in the middle 30's.
" H. B. RFP. No. 8o8 oN H. R. 6704, 75 th Cong., ist Sess. (1937), a report of the House Military
Affairs Committee.
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legislation. 9 Both the Republican and Democratic party platforms in 1924 conmined plans for the mobilization of industry in time of war and the control of
profits to be realized from war production. The American Legion, among others,
continued to press for favorable action in this matter, and finally in i93o, the
McSwain Resolution, then known as the Wainwright-Snell Resolution, was passedY'
Prior to this time, however, the Congress had not given any very serious attention to the elimination of war profiteering. In 1924 and in 1928 the Committee on
Military Affairs of the House of Representatives had held hearings on several comprehensive bills dealing with war mobilization and elimination of profiteering, but
no action was taken on these bills 7 1

Thus, the attempt to come to grips with the lack of organization and confusion
which characterized the first months of World War I culminated in the passage
of a resolution which created a commission "to study and consider amending the
constitution of the United States to provide that private property may be taken by
Congress for public use without profit during war and methods of equalizing the
burdens and to remove the profits of war, together with a study of policies to be
pursued in event of war." The Joint Executive and Congressional Commission,
the so-called War Policies Commission established pursuant to this resolution, conducted extensive hearings, brought out the inadequacies of the procurement procedures of World War I (particularly through the testimony of Mr. Bernard M.
Baruch), and made several reports to Congress.72 Its recommendations were primarily concerned with setting up methods of speedy and orderly procurement. It
endorsed the decision to abandon competitive bidding of war munitions in time of
war.73 The War Policies Commission did enter the field of profit limitation in
recommending that a constitutional amendment be passed to eliminate all doubts
as to the power of Congress to prevent profiteering, and further, that in time of
war individuals and corporations be taxed 95 per cent of all the income above the
previous three years' average 4 There is no doubt that world-wide economic and
political unrest spurred the Congress and the War Policies Commission to consider
more carefully and intensively the procurement and economic problems attendant
upon war. The Creditanstalt crashed in Vienna in 1931; Japan in the same year
attacked Manchuria, and in 1933 withdrew from the League of Nations.
In 1932, the Senate took up the recommendation of the War Policies Commission that a tax of 95 per cent of excess-profits tax be imposed in time of war, by
passing Senate Resolution No. I8o.7' which referred such recommendation to the
" H. J. REs. 400, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., introduced December 6, 1922.
PuB. R~s. No. 98, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., approved June 27, 1930, 46 STAT. 825.

70

"' House Committee on Military Affairs: Hearings on H. R. 4841, H. R. 8111, H.

J. Res.

128, 68th

Cong., ist Seas. (March 11, 13, 20, 1924); Hearings on H. R. 455, H. R. 8313, H. R. 8379, 7oth Cong.,

1st SesS. (1928). Cf. also, before Senate Military Affairs Committee, Hearings on S. z62o, 69 th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1926); SisN. J. REs. 20, 71st Cong., istSess. (x929).
" REP. VAn PoLiciEs Comm., H. R. Doc. No. 163, 72nd Cong., ist Sess. (93x); id. H. R. Doc. No.
"5 H. R. Doc. No. 163, 72nd Cong., Ist Sess. (931) 363.
264, 72nd Cong., ist Ses. (1932).
" H. R. Doc. No. 264, 72nd Cong., ist Sess. (1932).
"Adopted March 8, 1932, 72nd Cong., ist Sess.
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Secretary of the Treasury for his comments and opinions. The response of the
Secretary of the Treasury indicated that he did not believe enactment of such a tax
would solve the problem: 6 He began by pointing out that the "ideal war-income
tax would bring into the Treasury the entire amount of profits due to the war."
The Secretary reviewed the World War I experience with excess-profits taxes and
concluded that on the basis of such experience the suggestion to tax 95 per cent of
all income above the three-year average prior to the war was unworkable. Portions of the excess profits, he noted, were in the form of inventories and improvements or additions to factories; a five per cent margin was too small a safety factor
in view of the inevitable inaccuracies in calculating profits; invested capital as a
basis for measuring the excess of income was very unsatisfactory and "should not
be used again except as a last resort"; and the suggested rate might work great
hardships in the case of individuals and encourage the payment of excessive salaries
by corporations.
b. The limitation of the Vinson-Trammel Act
Following the reports of the War Policies Commission and of the Secretary of
the Treasury with respect to the Commission's excess-profits tax recommendation,
a number of bills and resolutions dealing rather generally with profit limitation
were introduced. The request in 1934 that the Congress appropriate funds to build
up the Navy to its treaty strength was the occasion for a spirited discussion in the
Congress as to the limitation of profits on munitions and led ultimately to the
incorporation in the Vinson-Trammel Act, authorizing the expansion of the Navy,
of a flat percentage limitation of profits. 7' The proposal to build up the Navy
brought forth a considerable amount of criticism.7 8 The whole matter of the
excessive profits enjoyed in the first World War was brought very much to the
fore, and the Congress, which had in the years following World War I done little
except authorize one major investigation, finally resolved to take some steps to limit
profits. Shortly after H. R. 6604, the Vinson-Trammel bill, became law (March
27, 1934), the Senate debated and passed a resolution authorizing Senator Nye
to begin his investigations of the munitions industry.P
Section 3 of the Act to establish the Composition of the Navy (the VinsonTrammel Act) provided that the Secretary of the Navy should not make contracts
for the vessels therein authorized unless the contractor agreed to pay into the
Treasury all profit, as determined by the Treasury Department, in excess of io
" SEN. Doe. No. 105, 72nd Cong., ist Sess. (1932)
response to S. Res. No. iSo).

(Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury in

7 48 STAT. 505 (1934), 34 U. S. C. 1940 ed. §496.

The President had authorized the use of some $238,ooo,ooo of P.W.A. funds for building ships
for the Navy, and the subsequent request by the Secretary of the Navy for additional funds aroused a
general discussion of naval policy and of profits on naval shipbuilding. 78 CoNG. REc. 1586 et seq.,
z6or (1934). Senator Borah delivered his "Take the Profits out of War" speech. 78 Cosso. Rrc. 3688
et seq. (1934).
71 SEN. Ras. No. 2o6, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., adopted April 12, 1934.
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per cent of the total contract price. Any subdivision of a Navy contract or subcontract 0 thereunder involving an amount in excess of $io,ooo was to be subject
to the conditions to which the prime contractor agreed. The Act further provided that, if the excess profit were not voluntarily paid, the Secretary of the Treasury might collect it by the methods usually employed for collecting income taxes.8 '
The contractor was to make available for inspection and audit all books and records. The method of ascertaining the amount of excess profit was to be determined
82
by the Secretary of the Treasury in agreement with the Secretary of the Navy;
credit was to be made for Federal income taxes paid or to be paid on the amount
of such excess profit8 3
As the method of percentage profit limitation was the only method put into
operation by Congress for the period 1934-1940, the chronological discussion of the
various proposals for limiting profits is interrupted to give a brief r&ume of the
Vinson-Trammel type of limitation during that period. By the Act of June 25,
1936, the Vinson-Trammel Act was amended to make it somewhat more flexible8 4
This amendment provided that the io per cent limitation should be applied to the
total contract prices of all contracts made during the taxable year; thus, losses on
some contracts could be offset against excess profits on others. Also provision was
made allowing net losses on contracts for the preceding taxable year to be deducted
in determining net profits for the current taxable year.
When Congress determined to build up the merchant marine, it incorporated
in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 the io per cent limitation of the VinsonTrammel Act as to contracts for the construction of merchant ships by the Maritime Commission. 5 The Merchant Marine Act added certain directions as to
computing costs and excess profit. No salary of more than $25,000 per year was
to be considered a part of the cost of building a ship in computing excess profit; 8
furthermore, the Maritime Commission was directed to scrutinize construction
"In Aluminum Co. of America v. Comrnmr. of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A. 543 (942),

the Board

of Tax Appeals narrowly construed the word "subcontract" appearing in the statute. The case is pending on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
" The Revenue Act of 1939, approved February io, 1939, specified that the Secretary of the Treasury should collect excess profits not voluntarily paid as required by the Vinson-Trammel Act and that all
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 683 (1934), including penalties, were to be applicable.
53 STAT. -I1 (1939), 26 U. S.C. 1940 ed. §§65o, 651.
"The first joint order determining the method of ascertaining the amount of excess profit was
T. D. 4434 issued in May, 1934. This was amended by T. D. 4723 (January 6, x937) and T. D. 4861
o
(September x9, 1938). T. D. 5000 was promulgated August 15, 194 , and thus was applicable only
for 2 months. Until April, 1942, however, T. D. 5ooo was applied as the basis for determining reimbursable costs under most Army and Navy cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts; it is still used today, by
the Army particularly, and for some Navy contracts.
" Cf. Section 3806 of the Internal Revenue Code, added by the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 798,
26 U. S. C. A. §3806 (Supp. 1942), with respect to renegotiation.
84 49 STT. 1926 (1936), 34 U. S. C. X940 ed. §496.
8 49 STAT-.x985, 1998 (1936) §505, 46 U. S. C. 194o ed. §1155.
s Cf. par. 45 of EXPLANATON oF PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINATION OF CosTs UNDER GOVERNMENT
CONTRA TS, put out by the War and Navy Departments in April, 1942; this paragraph also provides
for a top limit of $25,000 on salaries as allowable cost under a Government contract.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

costs and overhead expenses to determine whether they were "fair, just, and not in
'8
excess of a reasonable market price.
The Act of April 3, 19398s first extended the percentage profit limitation to
cover Army aircraft contracts. The Vinson-Trammel Act was further amended
to provide that the io per cent of the contract price limitation applied only to
naval vessels, and that 12 per cent was to be allowed on contracts for military or
naval aircraft. This statute also specified that a net loss or deficiency in profit,
due to failure to earn the permitted 12 per cent in any taxable year, might be
deducted during the next four taxable years in determining the excess profits. Also,
in this same month of April, 1939, the Secretary of the Navy was authorized to
enter into defense construction contracts on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis, with the
fee limited to io per cent of the cost of the contract exclusive of the fixed fee.8 D
Public Law.No. 671, 7 6th Congress, approved June 28, 1940 (the Navy "SpeedUp" Act),' completed the experimentation with the Vinson-Trammel Act. This
Act changed the percentages to define excess profit as that in excess of 8 per cent
of the total contract prices completed within a taxable year, or 8.7 per cent of the
total cost of performing such contracts, whichever was the lower, and to limit the
application of the Act to contracts in which the award exceeded $25,00o

($io,ooo

9

It may be said that all of these statutes establishing percentage
previously).
limitations (with the possible exception of the last) were straight peacetime measures, not designed to deal with profits of contractors under a full wartime procurement program.
On September 9, 194o, the profit limitation provisions of the Vinson-Trammel
02
Act, as amended, were limited to contracts for the construction of naval vessels.
With enactment of the Second Revenue Act of 1940 (October 8, 1940), the Congress
attempted to attack the problem of profits generally on munitions contracts by means
of the excess-profits tax,0 3 and accordingly it suspended the profit limitation statutes
applicable to all Army and Navy and to most Maritime Commission contracts and
subcontracts, entered into after December 31, 1939, or uncompleted on that date by
contractors and subcontractors subject to the excess-profits tax imposed by Title II
of the Revenue Act.0 4
The Vinson-Trammel Act and its amendments must be written off as a failure,
"'See regulations by the Maritime Commission under Merchant Marine Act, PnENrIcE-HALL, GovEZNILNT CONThurs, par. 22, 987.

a853 STAT. 555, 560 (1939) §14, 34 U. S. C. 194o ed. §496.
9

" Act of April 25, 1939, 53 STA. 590, 591.
STAT. 676, 677 (1940), 41 U. S. C. 1940 ed., note prec. §1.

80
91 54

Regulations were prepared jointly by the War, Navy and Treasury Departments: T. D. 4906,

4909 and 5000 (June 23, 1939, June 28, i939, August 15, 1940).
9254 STAT. 875, 883 (1940), 41 U. S. C. 1940 ed. note prec. §r.
"3 H. R. RP. No. 2894, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (August 29, 1940), a report of the House Ways and

Means Committee on H. R. 10413.
"The Treasury Regulations on limitation of profits were suspended. Cf. T. D. 5034 (941).
T. D. 5ooo, however, is still used by the Navy Department in determining allowable costs under some
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. The Vinson-Trammel Act provisions may be revived by proclamation of

the President or joint resolution of Congress.
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even in peacetime, in accomplishing any effective profits control. According to a
statement of the Treasury Department, the net amount assessed under the Act on
contracts for Navy vessels and aircraft up to August 31, 1942, was roughly $7,45oooo,

and on Army aircraft contracts for the same period, $7oooo 5 As plans for vastly
increased procurement of war munitions were made after the fall of France in 1940,
it was established that the Vinson-Trammel Act limitations were making shipbuilders and aircraft manufacturers reluctant to enter into contracts and were definitely
delaying the war programf 8 Investigations of profits on the contracts of the armed
forces, after suspension of the Vinson-Trammel Act, have quite conclusively
established that the Act was ineffectual to prevent very large profits to certain
97
contractors
c. Investigations and Discussion, 1934-1940
During this period 1934 to 1940, when the percentage profit limitation statutes
were in force, the Congress did consider a number of other methods for eliminating
excessive profits of war contractors. The Nye Committee's reports constituted
perhaps the most exhaustive investigation of war profits limitations; the Committee was extremely critical of the ineffectiveness of the World War I attempts to
limit profits, and seriously considered nationalizing the American munitions industry. 8 The Congress was conscious of war profits during this period as it had
never been before. Again its activities should be viewed in the perspective of
international events-in 1935 Mussolini marched into Ethiopia; in 1936 Spain became embroiled in civil war; and in 1937 Japan began to wage "active" war against
China and Hider started the series of moves which led to Munich and the outbreak of European war. Despite the publicity surrounding the Nye Committee
hearings and the vast amount of literature to the effect that the munitions-makers
had pushed the nation into World War I, the Congress was not unaware of the
possibility that the nation might be drawn into some future war. Certainly there
had never been so much study before any other war in our history as to the most
efficacious war mobilization and control of the war economy.
On March 2, 1934, about a month before the Nye Committee was established,
the House had passed House Resolution No. 275 ( 73 d Congress), authorizing the
House Military Affairs Committee to investigate alleged profiteering on Government contracts, particularly Army aircraft contracts. The preamble to this resolution as originally introduced indicated that it was passed in part because there
"5 Statement by the Treasury Department submitted by Senator Walsh, Hearings before a Subcommilttee of the Senate Finance Committee on Section 403 of Public Law 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (September 29 and 30, 1942) 96.
" See debate on the 1940 excess-profits tax bill, 86 CONG. REc. 1', 243 (August 29, 1940).
' Cf. SEN. RE. No. 480, Pt. 5, 7 7 th Cong., 2d Sess. (January 15, 1942) 87 (Truman Committee);
H. R. REP. No. 1634, 7 7 th Cong., 2d Sess. (January 2o, 1942), a report of the House Naval Affairs
Committee pursuant to H. RPs. No. 162.
See S. 2603, 7 5 th Cong.,
" SEN. Re'. No. 944, Pts. 4, 5 and 7, 74 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
ist Sess., introduced by Senator Nye on June 8, 1937, providing that the Secretaries of War and of the
Navy should acquire facilities to supply all war munitions.
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were "a number of bills pending before the Committee on Military Affairs of
utmost importance to the problem of national defense in general, and to the operations of the War Department."9 9
i.

H. R. 5529, 74 th Congress (1935)-American Legion Bill

H. R. 5529, 7 4th Congress, introduced by Representative McSwain of South
Carolina February 7, 1935, apparently was the first comprehensive bill to mobilize
production in time of war and to take the excessive profits out of war production
Tide I of this bill comprised
which was extensively considered by both Houses.0
a complete revenue act for wartime purposes. As passed by the House of Representatives on April 11, 1935, section 8 of Tide i provided that "upon the declaration of war there shal be imposed a tax of ioo per centum of all excess profits that
may be earned during said period of war as defined in this Act." After passage
by the House the bill was referred successively to the Nye Committee, the Senate
Military Affairs Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, all of which held
hearings and made reports upon the bill. The Nye Committee concluded that
H. R. 5529, as approved by the House, relied primarily upon price-fixing to control
profits, and recommended that a comprehensive excess-profits tax be adopted as
the most useful weapon to limit war profits.0 ° ' The Nye Committee, it is true,
also considered the excess-profits tax as vital for producing revenues to finance the
war. After the bill had been very drastically revised by the three Senate Committees, it was allowed to lapse in the Senate.
Meanwhile, the House in January, 1935, had held hearings on two bills approaching the limitation of profits as a part of a broad scheme of economic mobilization in time of war; these hearings are instructive in bringing out some of the
shortcomings of World War I attempts.' 2 These two bills were never reported
out by the House Committee, apparently because other bills covering the same
subject matter were receiving major consideration at the time.
"The preamble was stricken when the resolution was adopted, 78 CoNG. REe. 3622 (1934). This
resolution was prompted in large part by the accidents which occurred following the take over of the
air-mail routes by the Army. See 78 CoNG. Rlc. 3613-3622 (1934). The authority granted the Committee by this resolution was extended by H. R. REs. No. 59, 74 th Cong., adopted January x8, 1935.
CI. H. R. REP. No.
100 This bill was sponsored by the American Legion, and also by Mr. Baruch.
8o8 oN H. R. 6704, 7 5 th Cong., ist Sess. (I937) 2.
"'1SEN. RaP. No. 577, 7 4 th Cong., rst Sess. (May 3, 1935) (also printed with the report of the
Senate Military Affairs Committee, SEN. REP. No. 889, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess., June x4, x935). The
Senate Military Affairs Committee considered primarily the industrial mobilization features of the bill
and recommended that the tax provisions be referred to the Senate Finance Committee. SEN. REP. No.
889, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess.. (June 14, 1935). The Finance Committee considered the measure both as
a means of eliminating excessive profits and as a means of providing revenues. SEN. REP. No. 2337,
It rewrote the tax provisions of H. R. 5529 almost entirely.
7 4 th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 1o, 1936).
The Finance Committee provided for amortization of war facilities, contrary to the recommendations
of the Nye Committee. SEN. REP. No. 2337, supra, at 17.
2
'" Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 3 and 5293, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess.

(1935) (Taking the Profits out of War).
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War Department Industrial Mobilization bills (z935)

The War Department had prepared industrial mobilization and draft bills which
were to be submitted to Congress upon a declaration of war. These bills were
introduced in the Senate without prejudice early in 1935, in order to stir up discussion prior to the outbreak of any war.10 3 They were referred to the Nye Committee, which reported upon them on June

2,

i935.1

4

The Committee noted that

the proposed legislation relied primarily on price-fixing and taxation "to check
profiteering by industry in general and to eliminate the basic war evils of inequality
and inflation"'105 and warned that neither of these methods could provide an
adequate answer to excessive war profits.
3. Sheppard-May bill, Nye bill, and related bills (1937 and 1938)
The next major consideration of the economic problems raised by war and of
the elimination of excessive profits was the Sheppard-May bill, introduced in both
houses on January 6, I937.1°6
The Sheppard-May bill was sponsored by the American Legion and was also
supported by Mr. Baruch and the Secretaries of War and the Navy. 0 7 Section 9
of the Senate bill specified that upon the declaration of war "there shall be imposed a tax of 95 per centum of all income above the previous three-year average,
with proper adjustments for capital expenditures for war purposes by existing or
new industries." The Secretary of War made the following rather oblique comment about this provision:1°s
"Section 9 imposes an excess-profits tax to be effective during the period of war. The
War Department refrains from commenting on this section, believing that other agencies
of the Government are better qualified and have more direct responsibilities in connection
with taxation measures. It is desired to emphasize, however, that any tax measure
adopted must not remove the incentive to produce, and thus threaten the more vital
activity of securing the munitions required in war."

Both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy suggested a number of
amendments to the bill. The Secretary of the Navy stated in his letter to the
Committee:109
"o'War Department bills S. 1716-S. 1722, 74th Cong., ist Sess.
"o'SFN. REP. No. 944, Pt. 4, 74 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935).
"'Id. at 33. The approach of the War Department to profit limitation in these bills was much the
same as that of the War Policies Commission. Cf. H. R. Doe. No. 271, 72nd Cong., ist Sess. (1932).
100 S. 25, 75th Cong., ist Sess.; H. R. 1954, 7 5 th Cong., ist Sess., the companion bill, was introduced by Representative Hill of Alabama on the same date. Nothing was done with H. R. 1954 by the
House Committee on Military Affairs, and Representative May of Kentucky reintroduced substantially
the same bill, as H. R. 9604, 7 5 th Cong., 3d Sess., on February 24, 1938. A somewhat similar bill,
also sponsored by the American Legion (H. R. 6704, 75 th Cong., ist Sess.), was introduced by Representative Hill on April 27, 1937, and this bill was reported out by the Committee on May 12, 1937
(H. R. RFP. No. 808, 75th Cong., xst Sess.). H. R. 6704 in its tax provisions was very similar to the
later May bill (H. R. 9604). Mr. Baruch supported all of these bills, and made some rather extravagant claims for H. R. 6704 (see H. R. REP. No. 8o8, 7 5 th Cong., ist Sess. (i937) 5).
'07 See SaN. RaP. No. 480, 7 5 th Cong., ISt Sess. (1937) 2 et seq. (Comm. on Mil. Affairs).
o'"ld. at 15.
...Id. at 17.
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"The current difficulties being experienced by all of the procurement agencies of the
National Government due to the restrictive provisions of the Walsh-Healey Act (49 Stat.
2o36) as regards the employment of labor, and the Vinson-Trammel Act (48 Stat. 5o5),
as amended by the act of June 25, 1936 (49 Stat. 1926), restricting the profits of Government contractors seem to indicate the necessity for the removal of these restrictions to
insure the smooth operation of the Government procurement services in time of national
emergency.
"Tax provisions in any measure come solely within the purview of Congress, and,
therefore, the only comment offered on section 9 is quoted from exhibit x of the first
day's hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States
Senate, Seventy-fourth Congress, first session, on H. R. 5529, May 25 and 31, 1935, 'that
the tax provisions must not be of such a nature as to hinder the procurement of munitions
when the necessity for their manufacture arises.'"
Senators Nye and Lundeen of the Senate Military Affairs Committee submitted a
minority report on the Sheppard-May bill, 10 in which they stated that the bill
represented a "very peculiar kind of bargain. It offers something for every shade
of believer in what ought to be done in time of war." They criticized the excessprofits tax provisions, pointing out prophetically that our past history indicated
that a period of several years of foreign war might elapse before our entry into it;
that in such event there would be a substantial pre-war increase in prices and
profits resulting from trade with the belligerents; and that to use the three years
immediately preceding our entry into the war as the basis for determining excessive profits might result in the imposition of slight or no excess-profits taxes on
many war contractors.
In fact, Senator Nye's views as to the proper type of war excess-profits type
measure were embodied in S.1331, introduced February 2, 1937.111 Title I of this
bill established a complete income tax act to supersede existing revenue acts in time
of war. A tax of ioo per cent would be levied on that portion of a corporation's
net income in excess of 6 per cent of the adjusted declared value of its capital
stock (thus attempting to avoid the alleged disadvantages of using either invested
capital or the three-year income average prior to the declaration of war as a basis
for computing excess-profits).11
The Senate did nothing with this bill, which
presumably embodied the views of the Nye Committee, based on its investigations,
as to the most efficacious methods of controlling war profits.p 2
...Id. at 20.

III 75th Cong., IstSess. (i937). Senators Clark (Mo.), Bone (Wash.), Vandenberg (Mich.) and
Pope (Idaho) were also sponsors of this bill.

At this same time, Senator Connally, then Chairman of

the Senate Finance Committee, introduced a war tax bill-S. 1248, 75 th Cong., ist Sess., introduced
February 1, 1937. This bill prescribed a lower schedule of tax rates than the schedule provided in the
Nye bill, and based its corporate tax upon a percentage of the undistributed net income.

Senator

Connally in 1939 reintroduced substantially the same bill as S. 2x6o, 76th Cong., ist Sess. (introduced
on April 13, X939)-

..2 Various provisions were inserted in the bill to prevent undue deductions from gross income for
salaries, selling costs, depreciation and depletion. Senator Nye's bill also gave the President wide powers
in the field of economic control; Title III authorized him to fix prices, determine priorities, license
business, and requisition materials; other titles of the bill vested very broad controls over industry in
the 1President.
x2 cess-profits tax bills containing features of the Nye bill were introduced in both 1938 and 1939
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The House version of the Sheppard-May bill provided with respect to taxation

of war profits that there should be in effect "a system of taxation which shall absorb
all profits above a fair normal return to be fixed by Congress," and that the Secretary of the Treasury should make the studies required to formulate such a plan
of taxation. The House Committee on Military Affairs did not report on the bill
until March i, i938.P' The Committee was of the opinion that ioo per cent "of
all profits shown to be due to war-time business conditions" should "be taxed out
of the person, firm or corporation earning such excess profits," noting that this
recommendation was in accord with the earlier recommendations of the War
Policies Commissoin." 5 The House bill (and, it must be granted, the Senate bill
to a large extent) constituted merely a pious expression of hope as to eliminating
excessive war profits, and offered no concrete means of effecting such elimination."8
Representative Maverick introduced on February i6, 1938 a companion bill to
Senator Nye's earlier bill. 7 This bill contained only the tax provisions of the
Nye bill and eliminated completely all of the industrial control provisions. Nothing was ever done with either bill.
The reappearance of the May bill and the introduction of the Maverick bill
were occasioned by the President's message to the 7 5th Congress on January 28,
1938, 18 in which he stated:

"I believe that the time has come for Congress to enact legislation aimed at the prevention of profiteering in time of war and the equalization of the burdens of possible
war. Such legislation has been the subject for many years of full study in this and
previous Congresses."
In response to the President's message, a number of new bills were introduced in
the early months of 1938 dealing with the limitation of war profits, but none of
those bills was considered by the Congressional Committees." 9 The sole concrete
-S.

3912, 75th Cong., 3 d Sess., introduced April 27, 1938 by Senator Bone and 26 other Senators; and

S. 1885, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced March 21, 1939, by Senator Bone and 49 other Senators.
Twelve bills introduced in the House early in i939 were identical with the latter Senate bill (S. 1885)H. R. 5176, 5177, 5183, 5184, 5230, 5233, 5234, 5274, 5290, 5316, 5317, and 5360 (all introduced
between March 21 and 25, 1939). Both the Secretaries of War and of the Navy recommended against
enactment of S. 1885 largely on the basis of the drastic change in the economic structure of the country
which would be caused by making such a sweeping statute effective upon the outbreak of war. The
Secretary of WNar recommended that the whole subject of excess profits be studied by the Treasury
Department and legislation thereon be drafted and revised in peacetime, ready for presentation to Congress in emergency. See the letter of the Secretary of War dated May 5, 1939 and the letter of the
Acting Secretary of the Navy dated June 7, 1939, 86 CONG. Rac. 8624, 8625 (1940). All of these bills,
both Senate and House, were likewise tabled and forgotten.
114 H. R. REP. No. 1870, 75 th Cong., 3d Sess. (March i, 1938).
%inId. at 3.
...
Note the caustic remarks contained in the minority House report, submitted by Representatives
Maverick,
Anderson and Kale, id. at i5 el seq.
117
H. R. 9525, 75 th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). Senator Nye's bill, S. 1331, 75 th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937), is discussed above.
83 CoNG. REc. 1x88 (1938). To get the proper historical background it should also be noted
that this message of the President called for an increased Navy.
219 Note H. J. REs. 585, H. R. 9391, H. R. 9408, H. R. 9525 (the Maverick bill), H. R. 9604 (the
May bill), S. 3912, and H. R. 10912, 7 5 th Cong., 3d Sess.
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result of this recommendation of the President was the passage of the Act of May
17, 1938, amending the Vinson-Trammel Act and making it applicable to all contracts for the ships authorized for the increased Navy. 20
4. Adoption of Excess-Profits Tax Act (1940)
In 1939 and I94O, prior to enactment of the excess-profits tax, approximately 30

bills were introduced dealing with limitation of war profits generally. As war was
declared in Europe, and as war production mounted apace in this country, the
Congress grew more and more insistent upon adoption of some form of excessprofits tax. With the consideration of the 194o National Defense Tax bill in May
and June, 1940, it was apparent that the Congress was going to pass some form
of tax reaching profits on manufacture of munitions. Several amendments to the
National Defense Tax bill 2' (which became the Revenue Act of 1940) ,
which
amendments would have provided a comprehensive tax plan for wartime profits,
were adopted by the Senate but were eliminated from the bill in conference. The
House Ways and Means Committee had reported out the bill without any excessprofits tax provisions of general application, but had remarked in its report 22 that
it had carefully considered proposals "to provide special amortization for national
defense industries and to provide for the imposition of excess-profits taxes," which
it insisted should be considered together. It further noted that it had instructed
its technical assistants and the Treasury officials to prepare legislation on these subjects which could be made applicable to the calendar year 1940.
The Senate Finance Committee made some substantial changes in the bill, but
added no new provisions' 2 On June 19, 1940, when the bill was being debated
on the Senate floor, Senator LaFollette offered as an amendment a new Title IV,
providing for an excess-profits tax based on invested capital, with rates from 2o to
40 per cent of excess-profits' 24 This amendment was based on the i92i excessprofits tax (which was merely a modification of the Revenue Act of i918), and the
experience of 1917 to i92o with the excess-profits tax.' 25 Despite the arguments
raised that the matter should be more carefully considered, the Senate approved the
LaFollette amendment' 26 Senator Bone then offered as an amendment another
"War Profits Taxation Act," being in fact the old Nye bill of 1935,127 which had
been introduced and reintroduced a number of times. Senator Connally thereupon suggested as a substitute for Senator Bone's amendment, his own bill for
excess-profits taxes, which was a direct lineal descendant of the earlier bills which
.2 Cf. discussion, supra in text to note 77 et seq.
...H. R. 10039, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess. (1940).
121a.54 STAT. 516, 26 U. S. C. 1940 ed. §§xz et seq.
. 2.. H. R. REP. No. 2492, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess. (June 1o, 1940) 3.
"'SEN. REP. No. 1856, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 15, 1940).
124 86 CONG. Ric. 8594 (June 19, 1940).
..86 CONG. RiE. 8933 (June 22, 1940).
2. 86 CoNG. REc. 8607 et seq., 8614 (June 19, 1940).
'2786 CoNG. Rc.. 8619 et seq. (June 19, 2940). Cf. S. 3912, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., introduced
April 27, 2938, and S. 1885, 76th Cong., ist Sess., introduced March 21, 1939.
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he had introduced.- 28 Senator Connally's amendment was adopted by the Senate; 12 thus the bill as approved by the Senate contained two complete excess-profits
tax measures. Both amendments were stricken in conference, 180 with the understanding that the matter of excess-profits taxes would be studied intensively and
that action would be taken in the near future.
Shortly after approval of the Revenue Act of i94o, the President addressed a
brief message to Congress as follows:' a

"We are engaged in a great national effort to build up our national defenses to meet
any and every potential attack....

"It is our duty to see that the burden is equitably distributed according to ability to
pay, so that a few do not gain from the sacrifices of the many.
"I, therefore, recommend to the Congress the enactment of a steeply graduated excessprofits tax, to be applied to all individuals and all corporate organizations without
discrimination."

H. R. 10413, the excess-profits tax. bill, was introduced by Mr. Doughton on
August 27, 194o. This bill dealt with three related features: (I) suspension of the
profit limitations under the Vinson-Trammel Act; 32 (2) the provision of amortiza-

tion for defense facilities; and (3)an excess-profits tax. The House bill was a
rather complicated bill which allowed excess-profits to be measured by either of
two methods: average income for the base period i936-i939, or percentage of income for the base period to invested capital for the base period, 3 3 with certain
discriminations for corporations using the former method. The Senate Finance
Committee attempted to simplify the House bill, and changed it very substantially.'3 4 The Senate Committee believed that the House bill, which was favored
by the Treasury, was primarily a revenue raising bill rather than a prohibition of
excessive war profits' 3 " The Senate bill seems to have been drafted with the idea
that it achieved the "average-earnings" method of computing excess-profits, rather

than the "invested-capital" theory. The bill as finally adopted by both houses was
an extremely complicated measure which partook of both theories,' and clearly
'2S. 1248, 75th Cong., ist Sess., introduced February i, 1937; S. 216o, 76th Cong., ist Sess.,
13, 1939; ef. 86 CONG. RaG. 8624, 8626 (1940).
CONG. REC. 8630 (June i9,1940).
1.0 H. R. REP. No. 2697, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 21, 1940), a Conference Report on H. R. 10039.

introduced April

...
86

The bill was enacted into the Internal Revenue Code, 54 STAT. 516, 26 U. S. C. 1940 ed. §§12 et seq.
...H. R. Doc. No. 854, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (July 1, 1940), 86 CONG. REc. 9127 (1940).
'Mr. Vinson stated on the floor of the House that the defense program was being delayed because
of failure to suspend these provisions and to enact some excess-profits tax upon which contractors could
rely. 86 CoNG. Rac. 11243 (August 29, 1940).
a H. R. REP. No. 2894, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (August 29, 1940), a report of the Ways and Means
Committee.

204 SEN. RE. No. 2114, 7 6th Cong., 3d Sess. (September ii,

1940).

Senator LaFollette submitted a

minority report castigating the Senate bill and recommending that his own amendment to the earlier
194o bill be adopted.
.a 86 CONG. REc. 12057 et seq. (September 13, 2940).
' H. R. RaP. No. 3002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (September 30, 1940), a Conference Report on H. R.
10413, which was enacted into the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940 (October 8, 1940), 54 STAT. 974,
975 ff., 26 U. S. C. 194o ed. §§7b0 ff.
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represented an uneasy compromise 1 7 The excess-profits tax statute was amended
by the Excess-Profits Tax Amendments of 194I,18 and by the Revenue Act of
i942.' a° The rates are now 90 per cent of adjusted excess-profits net income, as

defined in the Act, or 8o per cent of the corporation surtax net income, whichever
is the lesser, with a post-war refund of io per cent of the tax.' 40 Even after
enactment of the excess-profits tax statute, Congress did not rely entirely on this
method of getting at profits. It retained in effect a number of statutes limiting the
fees on cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts, and enacted a number of additional statutes
limiting the fees on certain cost-plus contracts to specified percentages of the estimated cost.' 41 The excess-profits tax as enacted and amended was in large part
designed as a revenue measure.
The renegotiation statute adopted April 27, 1942, was aimed at the achievement of better prices to the Government in the procurement of munitions and the
elimination of excessive war profits by means of more accurate pricing to the Government. Since the enactment of the renegotiation statute, there have been a number of movements in Congress to repeal the statute entirely and to rely upon the
excess-profits tax for the elimination of war profits.
V. TI-m

EFFICACY OF WARTIUM PROFIT LIMITATION

The preceding chronological survey of profit limitation attempts prior to this
war indicates some fairly obvious conclusions. First and foremost of all, it must
be emphasized that prices and profits are not the primary consideration upon the
outbreak of war. As the Under Secretary of War has recently stated in testifying
as to renegotiation and alternative methods of controlling excessive war profits,
the armed forces "are more interested in getting the goods than anything else."' 42
...86 CoNG. REC. 12922 , 12923 (October 1, 1940).
23855 STAT. 17 (1941), incorporated into Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. §7zo (Supp. 1941).

ISO 56 STAr. 798, Act of October 21, 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 40

1d. at 5§202, 250, 26 U.

S. C. A. 710(a)(1), 780 (Supp. 1942).

"'ftl. 54 STAT. 872, 873, 10 U. S. C. 1940 ed. §1336a (Army contracts for military posts); 54
STAT. 965, 968, 1o U. S. C. 1940 ed. §1336a (Army contracts for military posts); 55 STAT. 49, 53
(March 23, 1941) (Navy public works contracts); 55 STAT. 151, 168 (May 6, 1941) (Navy construction
contracts); 55 STAT. 262 (June 24, 1941) (Navy public works contracts); 55 STAT. 366, 375 (June 3o,
1941)

(Army contracts for military posts); 55 STAT. 592, 593 (July 14, 1941)

(Navy public works

contracts) 55 STAT.; 658, 664 (August 21, 1941) (Navy public works contracts); 55 STrAT. 669, 679,
681 (August 25, 1941) (Navy public works contracts, Marine Commission contracts); 55 STAT. 745,
753 (October 28, 1941) (Navy public works contracts); 55 STAT. 810, 815 (December 17, 1941) (Navy
public works contracts); 55 STAT. 176, 178 (March 27, 1942) (Army and Navy contracts); 56
STAT. 314, 316 (June 5, 3942) (Army contracts for military posts); 56 STAT. 611, 632 (July 2, 1942)
(Army contracts for purchase of land); Pub. L. 92, 7 8th Cong. (June 26, 1943) (Navy contracts for
purchase of land). In addition certain statutes limiting profits to a fixed percentage remained in effect
after passage of the excess-profits tax-note particularly 54 STAT. 676, 41 U. S. C. 1940 ed. prec. §1
(Navy cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts). Also paragraph 7 of Tile II of EXECU-tVE ORDER No. 900!,
dated December 27, 1941, and promulgated under the First War Powers Act, 1941, approved December
i8, 1941, 55 STAT. 838, 50 U. S. C. §6oi (Supp. 194, Appendix), provides that in the absence of
other applicable profit limitation statutes, the fixed-fee under any cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract executed
under the War Powers Act should be limited to 7 per cent of the estimated cost.
1' Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee on Section 403 of Pub. L.
528,

7 7 th

Cong, 2d Sess. (September 29 and 30, 1942) 14.
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The nation must obtain large quantities of a very wide variety of munitions and
war supplies as rapidly as possible. So long as the nation maintains its present
form of economy based upon the profit motive, it will be necessary in many cases
to pay high prices to obtain these munitions and supplies. Mr. Baruch in a letter
143
to the Nye Committee succinctly stated the elementary truth of the matter:
"Much as it may be decried, the cold fact remains that ours is an economy motivated
by profits. A certain return on money is necessary to make otir industrial system work.
...Much was said at the hearing about this being a new war psychology.... Our
whole industrial system is a complex massive machine built and geared to run on investment and profit. There is no proof that it will run on psychology and there is much
that it will not. Certainly we should not select an hour when the enemy is at the gates
to find out whether it will or not.... Money will not invest and run the extreme risks
of war production for a fraction of 3 per cent."
Exactly the same point is made by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy in their
x
comments upon the excess-profits tax bills in i937.P'
The reports of the War
Policies Commission emphasized that the nation would have to do vastly better
in the way of getting munitions to the battle fronts than it had done in 1917 and
1918, and that while prices and profits would have to be carefully watched, they
were of distinctly secondary importance.
There have been, in the main, three major types of attempts to limit profits on
munitions contracts-specific percentage limitations on costs, price fixing and control, and taxation.
The limitation of profits to specific percentages has never worked well. The
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts constituted the first step along this line, and
the experience with those contracts indicated that the Government would never
again return to them. The Vinson-Trammel Act type of limitation in reality reduces all contracts thereunder to cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts, though the
controls are somewhat more dearly established. The Nye Committee's report indicated that the Vinson-Trammel Act was not achieving its purposes ;14 the Committee stated that it found "from wartime experience, enough evidence of the
difficulty of auditing thousands of old vouchers and of properly allocating the
overhead which the companies may have improperly saddled on to Navy vessels,
to declare that there is no effective profit limitation law today."146 Later investigations have proven that this type of limitation did not prevent excessive profits
even in peacetime. 47 Similarly, as the defense program was stepped up so substantially in 1940, there were indications that the Vinson-Trammel legislation was
definitely impeding the placement of war contracts. This type of profit limitation
has another very serious drawback in that, in the words of the Nye Committee,
'" SEN. REP. No. 944, Pt. 2, 7 4 th Cong., ist Sess. ('935) (letter dated April 12, 1935, page 11,
note Io).

,,Stipra notes xo8 and iog.
SEN. REP. No. 944, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 323 et seq.
'"SEN. REP. No. 944, Pt. 7, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 12.
"7 Supra notes 94 and 96.
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"there is absolutely no effective control of costs possible without a huge policing
system of auditors and inspectors constantly on the premises."'14 It is not to be
denied, of course, that cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts have a very necessary place in
the overall picture of war procurement, especially in its early phases when manufacturers are turning to products with which they are utterly unfamiliar. This
proposition again, however, emphasizes the fundamental premise that the assurance
of a reasonable profit to the contractors in order to get necessary supplies immediately, outweighs the consideration of more efficient methods of limiting profits.
Turning next to price controls, the limited experience of the Spanish-American
War and the attempt during the early months of the first World War to use pricefixing as the main method of eliminating excessive profits in munitions manufacture has indicated the ineffectuality of this method. In World War 1, in order to
obtain the necessary production by marginal producers, prices were set at a high
enough level to insure a profit to high cost manufacturers. The establishment of
a single price for both low and high cost producers resulted, however, in tremendous profits for the former.' 49 If different prices are set for different producers
so that each will receive his cost of production plus a reasonable profit, the net
result is that each producer has a cost-plus contract. In addition, the problems of
enforcement of price regulations are enormous. General MacArthur, then Chief
of Staff, told the War Policies Commission that evasion was inevitable if prices
of munitions were set at peacetime levels, and that "in the end the Government's
efforts would probably be largely gesture.""'
The personnel selected to administer price control and having the essential experience are inevitably either drawn
from the industries over which they are to exercise control, or must be guided by
the advice of businessmen from that industry. World War I experience proved
that there will undoubtedly be a favorable attitude to industry in fixing the price
levels. Robert R. Brookings, Chairman of the World War Price Fixing Committee, frankly told representatives of the nickel industry:'
"We are not in an attitude of envying you your profits; we are more in the attitude
of justifying them if we can. That is the way we approach these things."
Finally, experience with excess-profits taxation in the World War I and prior
to this war has not been such as to indicate that this method satisfactorily limits
war profits' 52 The difficulties of working out a satisfactory formula which will
eliminate the profits attributable to war and leave the necessary incentives to produce are almost insuperable. The chief stumbling block heretofore has been the
determination of a valuation base upon which to determine the percentage of
allowable return. The difficulties of fixing valuations of railroads and public
utilities are analogous to the problems which the tax authorities faced in World
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War I in applying the invested capital base3 3 The burden placed upon the
authorities charged with the administration of an excess-profits tax act are vast
indeed, especially in the light of the necessary discretion which must be placed in
such authorities in administering such act.
The case for the excess-profits tax as the primary means of limiting war profits
has recently been presented to the House Ways and Means Committee' 4 The
reasons most cogently urged on behalf of the excess-profits tax are the fact that it
allows the contractor to know or to estimate accurately what his net profits on
war production will be, and that it is a stabilizing factor in presenting a standard
for determining excessive profits. These arguments misplace the emphasis entirely;
the essential purpose of profit limitation in wartime must be the achievement of
more accurate and reasonable prices to the Government and, while certainty is
desirable, it must always be sacrificed to the broader interests of the Government.
The Truman Committee early this year investigated the administration of the
renegotiation statute. Its report succinctly stated the reasons why the attempts at
profit limitation prior to this war had never been successful : '
"(I) Because of the wartime need for rapid procurement of materials of war, new
materials with which there has been no previous manufacturing experience and other
articles previously manufactured only in relatively small quantities, some procedure for
subsequent price adjustment is necessary and desirable if excessive war profits and costs are
to be avoided.
"(2) Taxes alone will not do the job because (a) higher corporate tax rates are likely
to encourage higher costs and discourage economical production; (b) no scheme of taxation has been devised which is sufficiently flexible to provide an incentive for efficient
low-cost production; (c) a profit percentage which would fairly reward one war contractor with a different financial setup, and would provide inordinately excessive profits
for a third contractor with a still different financial problem.
"(3) War contractors in most cases can protect themselves against loss by escalator
clauses and other contract provisions for contingencies. The people can obtain protection
in many cases only through some procedure such as renegotiation.
"(4) Experience has shown 'cost-plus' contracts to be worse than worthless in the
effort to prevent excessive costs. They strongly tend to increase costs instead of the
reverse."
It seems extremely unlikely that any legislation can have more than moderate
success in eliminating all profits arising solely out of war or in equalizing the
burdens of war. War tax measures appear to have achieved a good deal in the
way of raising revenues; experience thus far has indicated that they can do little
to eliminate the abnormal profits arising from war. The advocates of the excessprofits tax have no answer to the proposition that it is necessary to have flexibility
in working out equitable limitations of war profits, and the excess-profits tax
153 SFN. REP. No. 944, Pt. 2, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 25 et seq., discusses some of the technical
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achieves a rigid uniformity which experience has plainly shown is not adequate to
achieve reasonable prices of munitions to the Government. The excess-profits tax
does achieve some degree of certainty for contractors, but the price of such certainty
is the ineffective rigidity which so hampers the Government.
All efforts at war profit limitation involve attempts to achieve as much saving as
possible to the Government in the way of making munitions prices reasonable in
the light of the speed in procurement required. Such efforts have also sought to
preserve the continued efficacy of the profit motive to induce extraordinary war
production and industrial effort. So long as the nation's war production is premised
on the profit motive, industries engaged in war work will and should make "reasonable" profits, which will presumably exceed the profits of industries not so
engaged. All efforts at profit limitation prior to this war have been faced with
two major problems-first, the determination of what are "reasonable" profits or
prices to the Government, or, stating it obversely, the determination of a proper
standard for defining excessive profits, and second, the discovery of effective means
to prevent profits from exceeding such standard. No general rules have as yet
successfully been laid down for solving these two excessively complicated problems
as applied to all cases. "Reasonable" is a rather imprecise word when applied to
war profits, as in any other connotation, and attempts to define it meet the problem
of using other rather broad and indefinite terms. Reasonable war profits are those
which will encourage the contractor to efficient war production and yet will not
make the prices of munitions unfair to the Government. Reasonable profits are
those which, when judged by the general standards and mores of the day, are
acceptable to the majority of the citizens of the nation.
Consider for a moment the difficulties inherent in establishing a standard. War
contracts vary widely in substance and form. Airplanes purchased for $iooooo,ooo
can be produced more rapidly than a battleship costing the same amount. Reasonable profits under a contract involving $ioooooooo to be performed within one
year with a minimum capital investment may be quite different from reasonable
profits to be allowed on a contract requiring the same amount of money but to be
completed over a period of three or more years and requiring a larger permanent
investment. In determining what profits are excessive, it is also necessary to consider the varying treatments fairly to be accorded contractors whose plant facilities
and working capital are supplied by the Government and to contractors supplying
plant and working capital in addition to management.
The effect of increased volume and the experience which goes with it must
also be studied. It is often difficult to make allowance for such factors in advance.
Costs and profits seemingly reasonable at the start of the contract often become
unreasonable after volume and experience have increased. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider to what extent the procurement agencies are to offer rewards for
increased speed and efficiency. High costs can be more expensive than high profits.
While there must be some review or limitation of the amount of the reward for
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speed and efficiency, there is no doubt that the force of the profit motive must not
be unduly restricted, at least until some equally compelling substitute is found.
Turning to the second part of the problem of devising equitable methods for
limiting war profits, and assuming that a standard of reasonable profits has been
devised to fit all cases and accurately weigh all relevant factors-an untenable
assumption in the light of our past experience-it may be doubted whether a universal rule should be laid down which will require a return to the Government of
all profits above that standard. Consideration must always be given to the desirability of offering the contractor a chance of increased profits in return for increased
efficiency and production; such increased profits may be very small and continuously
diminish. England in the early months of the war collected through excess-profits
taxes all profits above a certain standard established for each taxpayer by reference
to profits in pre-war years. After a trial, England apparently concluded that the
absolute limitation of profits should be modified, and provided for an unconditional
return after the war of 20 per cent of the war excess-profits tax. Thus the spur of
an ever increasing profit, no matter how small, has been preserved.
The intricacy of our economic organization and the dependence, particularly
in time of war, of prime contractors upon subcontractors, raise their own peculiar
problems in the establishment and administration of any standard of reasonable
profits. The skilled personnel and detailed work required to administer any form
of profit limitation have already been touched upon.
The war profit limitation attempts prior to the present war have demonstrated
conclusively that there is no categorical answer to the matter of elimination of war
profits and prices of munitions. Experience in this war might indicate that there
is no reasonably satisfactory answer to be had to the problem so long as we operate
with the profit motive as the primary incentive for wartime production. The
nation entered World War I entirely unequipped to cope with either the production problems or the economic problems facing it. The nation entered this war
far better prepared to meet the incredibly complex production problems incident
to the war. Notwithstanding, however, the great amount of effort expended in
the i93o's in the investigation and consideration of various methods of wartime
profits controls, the country was hardly better equipped to meet the problems of
munitions prices and profits on December 7, 1941, than it was on April 6, 1917.

This is not to suggest that the exhaustive investigations of war profits during this
period did not serve a purpose; indeed, they served a very useful purpose in pointing out the shortcomings of our previous efforts at war profit limitation and lighting up the major problems to be faced in formulating a control over munitions
prices. Again, it is possible to suggest that there is no answer to our failure to be
prepared to handle this problem efficiently and expeditiously upon the outbreak of
war. Having balanced the equities, the nation has concluded that the incentive
of the profit motive, with its obvious attendant difficulties as to profit limitations,
is to be preferred to a system based upon some other theory, under which perhaps
complete control over return upon capital could be established.

